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Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between aggregate wages and individ-
ual wages when there is time series variation in employment and in the
dispersion of wages. A new and easily implementable framework for the
empirical analysis of aggregation biases is developed. Aggregate real wages
are shown to contain three important bias terms: one associated with the
dispersion of individual wages, a second re°ecting the distribution of work-
ing hours, and a third deriving from compositional changesin the(selected)
sample of workers. Noting the importance of these issues for recent expe-
rience in Britain, data on real wages and participation for British male
workers over the period 1978-1996 are studied. A close correspondence
between the estimated biases and the patterns of di®erences shown by ag-
gregate wages is established. This is shown to have important implications
for the interpretation of real wage growth over this period.
JEL: C34, E24, J31.
Keywords: Aggregate Real Earnings, Participation, Wage Distribu-
tion.
¤University of California at Berkeley, Institute for Fiscal Studies and Department of Eco-
nomics, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT.
y Institute for Fiscal Studies and Department of Economics, University College London,
Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT.
z Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial Drive,















  		   
	  	 			
























  	 	  
   	 	    


	    	 	 
 !	  
  	

		   




 	   
  		




























































	   1 ,. !2#+3 		

	 










		    	 	   	

		  ! 

   




   
 
	   	 

















































Aggregate ¯gures for real wage growth appear extensively in policy debate.
They areused to re°ect changes in the well being of workers over time and are also
used for comparisons across education or cohortgroups andfor comparisons across
countries or regions. However, as pointed out in the original study by Bils (1985),
if participation rates change di®erentially across the time periods or across the
groups used in these comparisons, then aggregate real wages are likely to provide
a misleading picture of changes in the structure of real wages facing individual
workers. For example, if the overall distribution of skills in the workforce remains
unchanged, aggregate wages will increase when relatively low wage individuals
leave employment, but it is hard to argue that `well being' has been improved
in any meaningful way. This paper develops a simple characterization of the
relationship between employment and aggregate wages and derives the precise
form of the bias in inferring the behavior of individual wages from the analysis of
aggregate (average) hourly earnings, or aggregate wages.
Our approach has its foundations in a basic model of human capital and skill
price as developed in Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) but can be cast in a number
of di®erent frameworks. Returns to human capital are allowed to be time varying
in response to sectoral and cyclical demand and supply shocks. Bias occurs when
trying to assess the cyclicality or trend behavior of wages or returns to education
1Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Orazio Attanasio, Amanda Gosling, Lars
Hansen, James Heckman, Costas Meghir, Julian McCrae, referee and editor as well as semi-
nar participants at Berkeley, Chicago, MIT and LSE for comments on an earlier draft. The
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1using aggregate wage measures. In this paper the bias is shown to decompose into
three interpretable terms re°ecting changes in thedistribution ofindividual wages,
changes in participationandchanges inhours worked. The ¯rst term describes the
dispersion ofwages and arises from aggregation over thestandardlog-linear model
of individual wages. This term explicitly measures the e®ect of increasing wage
dispersion separately from the impact of participation. The second term measures
the adjustment for composition changes in hours and depends on the size of the
covariance between wages and hours. The ¯nal term highlights the importance
of the participation decision, capturing the e®ects of composition changes within
the selected sample of workers from which measured wages are recorded. As in
the standard selection bias literature, this third factor depends on the covariance
between participation and wages. These bias terms are then investigated using
data for male wages from the British economy in the 1980s and 1990s. These
data analyses point to signi¯cant deviations between aggregate and individual
measures that imply important revisions in the interpretation of real wage growth
over this period.
We identify three reasons why the British labor market experience during the
last two decades is particularly attractive for this analysis. First, there have
been strong secular and cyclical movements in male employment over this period.
Second, there existsa longandrepresentativetimeseries of individual survey data,
collected at the household level, that records detailed information on individual
hourly wages as well as many other individual characteristics and income sources.
Finally, over this period, there has been a systematic change in the level of real
out-of-work income. The household survey data utilized in this study allows an
accurate measure of this income variable which, in turn, acts as an informative
instrument in controlling for participation in our analysis of wages.
2Labor market behavior in Britain over the last twenty years serves to reinforce
the importance of these issues. Indeed the relationship between wage growth and
employment in Britain has often been the focus of headline news.2 Figure 1.1
displays the time series of aggregate hourly wages and aggregate employment for
men in the UK between 1978 and 1996. In 1978-9, over 90% of men aged between
19 and 59 were employed. The participation rate fell dramatically in the recession
of the early 1980s and then recovered somewhat in the late 1980s (although not to
its initial level). In the early 1990s there was another recession and another sharp
decline. In contrast, log average wages show reasonably steady increase from 1978
throughthe 1990s, growing more than 30% in real terms over this period andeven
displaying some growth during the severe recession of the early 1990s.3
The analysis presented in this paper shows this picture of the evolution of real
wages to be highly misleading. Making our three corrections reveals real wage
growth tohave beennomore than 20% withnoevidence of real growth whatsoever
in the early 1990s. Moreover, we show this corrected series is precisely estimated
and robust to parametric speci¯cation. The large discrepancy in the level and
growth between the aggregate and individual wage paths that we ¯nd is shown to
be almost completely captured by the aggregation factors we develop, validating
our model speci¯cation and providing a detailed interpretation of the aggregation
biases involved. The discrepancy is associated with an important upward bias in
the aggregate trend of real wages and a reduction in the degree of procyclicality.
The picture of employment °uctuations is even more dramatic between educa-
tion groups and date-of-birth cohorts. Given the strong interest in the economics
literature on returns to education across education and cohort groups (see Card
2For example, \Rise in Earnings and Jobless Sparks Concern", Financial Times, front page,
June 18th, 1998.
3As we show below, over the same period, average weekly hours show very limited variation.
3and Lemieux (1999) and Gosling, Machin and Meghir (1998), for example), the
impact of these employment °uctuations on estimated returns to education across
these groups is important. Figure 1.2 presents the picture of employment by ed-
ucation level for two central cohorts. For the cohort born 1945-54, the steep fall
in employment experienced by the lower education group in the early 1980s is
not matched in the employment patterns of the higher educated groups. Indeed,
the level and growth in dispersion also di®ers substantially across cohort and
education groups. The results from this paper show that the selection e®ect is
often substantial and suggests a large underestimate in the level and growth in
education returns. However, this selection e®ect that adjusts for the di®erential
employment pro¯les across cohort and education groups is often more than o®-
set by adjustments for the di®erent level and growth in dispersion across these
education and cohort groups.
To identify these corrections to the aggregate series we need some variable
that moves male employment rates but does not e®ect the distribution of wages
conditional on education, age and other observed wage determinants. For this
we use another feature of recent British experience: the large changes in the real
value of transfer income which individuals receive (or would receive) while out
of work. Figure 1.3 shows the time series variation of out-of-work income. This
income measure is simulated for all households of a particular type using a tax
and bene¯t simulation model. This ¯gure shows the time series for a group of
married low education men in rented accommodation - a particularly relevant
group. The housing bene¯t component of out-of-work income, which is a means
tested bene¯t covering a large proportion of rental costs, is a major contributory
factor in the rise of out-of-work income for low education families. Although it
is unlikely that variation in real value of bene¯t income can explain all of the
4variation in participation rates, we argue that changes in real bene¯ts serve as
an important \instrumental variable" for controlling for endogenous selection in
real wages. Moreover, housing bene¯t varies strongly across time, location and
cohort group. The cohort variation occurs because individuals in lower educated
older cohorts had a much higher chance of spending their lives in public housing.
We take this variation to be exogenous to the individual employment decision
conditional on the cohort, education, region, trend and cycle e®ects. Using this
\instrument" for selection, the individual level wage equation results show a sig-
ni¯cant selection e®ect that varies systematically over the trend and cycle and
di®ers across education groups.
The layout of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the
modeling framework that will underlie the empirical work. We derive some new
results on aggregating over lognormal distributions, and then we apply the results
to spell out the empirical implications of our model to individual and aggregate
level wage data. These aggregation biases are likely to be particularly important
for the study of wages and returns in Europe where there have been dramatic
and systematic changes in the variance of hourly wages, the distribution of hours
of work and in participation rates; features that have occurred both secularly
and cyclically. Our application to real wages for men in Britain presented in
Section 3 shows important impacts of heterogeneity and labor participation. To
anticipate, we ¯nd that changes in dispersion of individual wages, attributable
to both observable and unobservable factors, lead to a secular increase in the
bias from using aggregate wage measures. In contrast we ¯nd that the changes
in composition, induced by the pattern of labor market participation, induce a
counter cyclical bias in the aggregate measure. Section 4 draws some conclusions.
52. Aggregation and Selection
2.1. A Model for Real Wages
The approach we use for modeling individual wages follows Roy (1951) in
basing wages on human capital or skill levels, assuming that any two workers
with the same human capital level are paid the same wage. Thus we assume
that there is no comparative advantage, and no sectoral di®erences in wages for
workers with the same human capital level.4 We assume that the mapping of
skills to human capital is time invariant, and that the price or return to human
capital is not a function of human capital endowments. In particular, we begin
with a framework consistent with the proportionality hypothesis of Heckman and
Sedlacek (1990).
The simplest version of the framework assumes that each worker i possesses
a human capital (skill) level of Hi. Human capital is nondi®erentiated, in that it
commands a single price rt in each time period t. In this case the wage paid to
worker i at time t is
wti = rtHi (2.1)
Human capital Hi is assumed log-normally distributed5, with mean
E (lnHi) = ±js
andvariance ¾2, where ±js is alevel that varies withthe cohort j to which i belongs
and the education level s of worker i. In other words, the log wage equation has
4Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) provide an important generalization of this framework to
multiple sectors. We plan on examining a multisectoral model as part of future research. In
addition, the importance of normality assumptions in such a generalization is explored further
in Heckman and Honore (1993).
5Although we utilize lognormality assumptions extensively in this section, their reliability is
assessed in the empirical analysis that follows.
6the additive form
lnwit = lnrt + ±js + ²it (2.2)
where ²it is N (0;¾2).6 In this model growth in returns is constant across all
individuals. Below we allow education returns to di®er over time.
Reservation wages w¤
it are also assumed to be lognormal, with
lnw
¤
it = ®lnbit + ´js + ³it (2.3)





and where bit can be interpreted as an exogenous bene¯t
level that varies with individual characteristics and time. Participation occurs if
wit ¸ w¤
it, or with
lnrt ¡ ®lnbit + ±js ¡´js +²it ¡ ³it > 0 (2.4)
and we represent the participation decision by the indicator Ii = 1[wit ¸ w¤
it]:
For examining hours, we will make one of two assumptions in our empirical
work. The ¯rst is to assume that the distribution of hours is ¯xed. The other
is to assume that desired hours hit are chosen by utility maximization, where
reservation wages are de¯ned as hit(w¤) = h0 and h0 is the minimum number of
hours available for full-time work.7 We assume hit (w) is normal for each w, and
approximate desired hours by
hit = h0 + °(lnwit ¡ lnw
¤
it)
= h0 + °(lnrt ¡ ®lnbit + ±js ¡ ´js + ²it ¡ ³it):
In our derivations of aggregationformulae below, we retain the secondassumption
(since we can easily specialize to the ¯rst assumption).
6Clearly, there is an indeterminacy in the scaling of rt and Hi. Therefore, to study rt, we
will normalize rt for some year t = 0 (say to r0 = 1). We could equivalently set one of the ±'s
to zero.
7This allows for a simple characterisation of ¯xed costs, see Cogan (1981).
7This is our base level speci¯cation that maintains the proportionality hypoth-
esis. There are no trend or cycle interactions with cohort or education level in
either equation.
Two extensions of this basic framework are made necessary by our empirical
¯ndings. First, suppose that education produces a di®erentiated type of human
capital. That is, a high education worker i has human capital (skill) level of HH
i
and is paid the wage rH
t HH
i . A low education worker i has human capital (skill)
level of rL
t HL
i and is paid the wage rL
t HL
i . As before, similar workers with a
particular skill level are paid the same in all sectors. If Di is the high education





js +(1 ¡ Di)lnr
L
t + (1¡ Di)±
L
js +²it: (2.5)
Here, education can have a time varying impact on wages.
The second extension is to allow the di®erent stock of labor market experience
that is associated with each cohort at any speci¯c calender time tohave an impact
on returns. This generalizes the basic model to allow log wages to display di®erent
trend behavior for each date-of-birth cohort group.
2.2. Aggregate Wages and Micro-Macro Comparisons
Measured wages at the individual level are represented by an entire distribu-
tion. Therefore, there are many ways to pose the question of whether aggregate
wage movements adequately re°ect movements in individual wages. We consider
various alternatives here, each of which could be adopted.










8where i 2 (I = 1) denotes a labor market participant and where eit = hitwit is






We take the population of participating workers as su±ciently large so that we
can ignore sampling variation in average earnings and average hours; modeling




where E[¢] refers to the mean across the population.
The basic framework suggests an economically sensible answer to how to com-
pare individual and aggregate wages. From (2.1), the natural question is whether
aggregate wage movements accurately re°ect movements in the skill price rt, or
the price of human capital. For example, if aggregate production in the economy
has total human capital (
P
iHi) as an input, then the appropriate price for that
input is rt. Therefore, the economic comparison to the relevant (quality adjusted)
price of labor is
rt versus wt:
Other interpretable comparisons arise on statistical grounds. Following the
traditionof measuring\returns" from coe±cients inlog wage equations, one could
focus on the behavior of the mean log wage. This refers to the comparison
E(lnwit) versus lnwt:
This approach is adopted in the work of Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994), as well
as in our empirical work. Note that if the log mean of Hi is constant over time
in our basic framework, then the mean log wage comparison matches the original
9\rt versus ¹ wt" comparison (in log form). We have listed these comparisons sepa-
rately because one might be interested in the log wage comparison even without
a framework tracing wages to human capital. For completeness, note that one
could compare aggregate wages with many other individual concepts, such as the
mean log wage for participating workers, as in
E(lnwitjI = 1) versus lnwt:
2.3. Micro Regressions
The underlying individual model is comprised of the following log-wage equation,
an hours equation and an employemnt selection equation
lnw = ¯0 + ¯
0
x+ ²;














where x refers to predictors in the log-wage equation, such as human capital
variables that would represent ±js in (2.2), or the predictors in the extended
versions of the model.
Our formulations of aggregate wages are based on results on aggregation of
nonlinear relationships. We make use of several standard formulae familiar from
the analysis of selection bias collected in Appendix A. To derive the implications
of the behavioral model on individual level data (at time t), we require

















10Using the results in Appendix A1, the log mean wage is given by





































measures the impact of selective participation.
Allowing for hours variation, we can likewise compute average hours and
weighted average wages. The micro log-wage regression for participants is













where ¸[¢] = Á[¢]=©[¢] is the inverse Mills ratio, and where Á and © are the
standard normal density and c.d.f. respectively.
Combining the dispersion, hours and participation terms we have a complete
summary of the adjustments required to relate the mean of the unconditional
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8Appendix A2 contains some intermediate derivations for this formula.
112.4. Macroeconomic Equations
Because we have extensive individual level data on wages, we can model
aggregate wages by \adding up" the respective terms; namely microsimulation.
However, it is useful to derive speci¯c representations of the impact of participa-
tion and hours heterogeneity, and for this we need an assumption on the distri-
bution of the micro variables x and z in the population for a given time period
t. We make the following distributional assumption, which is not only convenient
but (as we show) reasonably accurate in our applications.9
Distributional Restriction: The indexes determining log wages and participa-








































which is in the same form as the micro participation equation with z replaced by
































9Since we utilize many discrete regressors in our application (cohort and education indica-





If this assumption only applies within di®erent population segments, then our equations could
be applied segment by segment, and aggregated across segments to form the ¯nal speci¯cation
of aggregate wages.
10This formula was ¯rst derived by McFadden and Reid (1975)
11A formula of this form was originally derived by McCurdy (1987).
12we can get an interesting formula

















which has the same form as the selection adjusted micro equation, with the spread





If there were no variation in hours (i.e. if hours weights were equal across
individuals), ), the appropriate macroeconomic wage equation (by Lemma A1) is
































































For later comparison, we can write the log of mean wage as



















Turning to hours h (in (2.7)), analogous calculations give average hours as







































































To summarize, there are three aggregation factors that need to be accounted














; measures the adjustment for composition changes in hours and de-






; highlights the importance of composition changes within the se-
lected sample of workers from which measured wages are recorded. As in the
standard selection bias literature, it too depends on the covariance between par-
ticipation and wages.
2.5. The Nature of the Aggregation Bias
To anticipate our application, we now illustrate how the aggregation biases
can manifest themselves in data on labor participation and wages. Setting ¯0 +
¯
0
xit = lnrt +±st in (2.7) generates our baseline formulation (2.2). Participation
follows the simple reservation wage rule (2.4), that is
Pr[Iit = 1] = ©
Ã










14The time series evolution of the log aggregate hourly real wage, measured among
workers, is characterized by

















The latter term is the adjustment to the aggregate wage toallow for the selectivity
on unobservable attributes ²it in the log wage equation induced by participation.






, for the typical case in which
¾²º > 0; selection induces an upward bias in the average wage. Consider what
happens as the return lnrt increases over time with E(±st) constant. For ¾²º > 0
this results in a decrease in ln[©¾²º;t=©t] and the corresponding downward bias
in the average wage. Aggregation can therefore o®set the procyclicality of wages,
because of the entry of individuals with lower values of unobserved attributes ²it
during upturns: That is





= (1+ ¸¾²º;t ¡ ¸t)dlnrt
The composition bias term





















￿ 0 for ¾²v ¸ 0:
This analysis is easily extended to the case of two (or more) education or skill
groups. Suppose there is a decrease in returns for the lower skilled workers. That
is, suppose lnrL
t in(2.5) falls. The decline in rL reduces participationamonglower
15skilledworkers andthe conditional wage may rise, since theremaining participants
will be a more severely selected sample with higher ²it on average. This implies
that the average wage could show growth even though lnrL
t is declining.
3. British Aggregate Wages and Participation
3.1. The Data
The microeconomic data used for this study are taken from the UK Family
Expenditure Survey (FES) for the years 1978 to 1996. The FES is a repeated
continuous cross-sectional survey of households which provides consistently de-
¯ned micro data on wages, hours of work, employment status and education for
each year since 1978.13 Our sample consists of all men aged between 19 and 59
(inclusive).14 For the purposes of modeling, the participating group consists of
employees; the non-participating group includes individuals categorizedas search-
ing for work as well as the unoccupied. The hours measure for employees in FES
is de¯ned as usual weekly hours including usual overtime hours. The weekly earn-
ings measure includes usual overtime pay. We divide nominal weekly earnings by
weekly hours to construct an hourly wage measure, which is de°ated by the quar-
terly UK retail price index to obtain real hourly wages. The measure of education
used in our study is the age at which the individual left full-time education. Indi-
viduals are classi¯ed in three groups; those who left full-time education at age 16
or lower (the base group), those who left aged 17 or 18, and those wholeft aged 19
13Prior to 1978 the FES contains no information on educational attainment.
14We exclude individuals classi¯ed as self-employed. This could introduce some composition
bias, given that a signi¯cant number of workers moved into self employment in the 1980s.
However, given that we have no data on hours and relatively poor data on earnings for this
group, there is little alternative but to exclude them. They are also typically excluded in
aggregate ¯gures.
16or over.15 We model cohort e®ects on wage levels by a set of cohort dummies; ¯ve
date-of-birth cohorts (b.1919-34, b.1935-44, b.1945-54, b.1955-64 and b.1965-77).
Our measure of out-of-work income (income at zero-hours) is constructed for
each individual as follows. This measure is evaluated using the tax and bene¯t
simulation model16, which constructs a simulated budget constraint for each indi-
vidual given information about his age, location, bene¯t eligibility and partner's
income (if married/cohabiting). The measure of out-of-work income is largely
comprised of income from state bene¯ts; only small amounts of investment in-
come are recorded. For married men we do not include the spouse's income from
employment. We control for the spouse's characteristics, in particular her level
of education and full set of interactions between, age, region and calendar time.
State bene¯ts include eligible unemployment bene¯ts17 and housing bene¯t, which
gives assistance with housing costs.
Sinceour measure of out-of-work income will servetoidentify the participation
structure, it is important that variation in the components of out-of-work income
are as exogenous to the decision to work or the level of wages as possible. In
the UK, the level of bene¯ts which individuals receive out-of-work varies with
age, time, household size and (in the case of the housing bene¯t) by region. As
mentioned before, housing bene¯t varies systematically with time, location and
cohort. One of the primary features of housing bene¯t is that older cohorts
15An alternative to our method for constructing the education dummy would use those who
left education at the statutory minimum age as the base group. This method is equivalent to
ours from 1973 onwards in the UK; before this date the minimum school leaving age was a year
lower, at 15. Nonetheless, interactions between date-of-birth cohort e®ects and the education
dummy will capture any e®ects of the change in minimum leaving age on the relative returns
to education enjoyed by the 17+ group. See Gosling et. al (1996).
16The IFS tax and bene¯t simulation model TAXBEN (see www.ifs.org.uk), designed to utilise
the British Family Expenditure Survey data used in this paper.
17Unemployment Bene¯t included an earnings-related supplement in the late 1970s, but this
was abolished in 1980.
17had much higher availability of public housing during their household formation
period and would have been likely to stay in public housing. Since 1978 the rents
in public housing have risen dramatically. For those out of work, housing bene¯t
would have covered these increases, which may have had the e®ect of increasing
the reservation wage for those in public housing.
After making the sample selections described above, our sample contains
71,902 observations. The number of employees in the data is 52,089, or 72.4% of
the total sample. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide a description of the cell proportions
by marital status and education level over the period of our analysis. As Table
3.1 shows, the proportions of single and married men in the data are relatively
constant from 1984 onwards, although there were rather less single men in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.
3.2. Results
We consider a number of possible speci¯cations for our individual level par-
ticipation and wage equations which relate to the various speci¯cations discussed
in Section 2.18 Our model of participation includes out-of-work income interacted
with marital status, as well as the variables included in the log wage equation.
The results of estimating the participation (probit) equation show a strong signi¯-
cance of this bene¯t income variable. This is important as it is our primary source
of identi¯cation.19 The sheer number of interactions makes it hard to discern the
impact of the various regressors, and we conduct joint signi¯cance tests for sets
of regressors and interactions between them. These are presented in Table 3.3 for
the participation probit and the wage equation with the selectivity correction via
18A full set of results is available from the authors. It also appears as Appendix B in the
Institute for Fiscal Studies (www.ifs.org.uk) working paper version.
19The full results are available on request.
18the inverse Mills ratio.
In estimation we are unable to use data on housing bene¯t for the year 1983.
This is because the system of bene¯t assistance for tenants was reformed in 1983
and the information on rent levels and bene¯t receipts was not collected properly
by Family Expenditure Survey interviewers. We do, however, have a consistent
series for 1978-82 and 1984-1996. Below we present results for the completeperiod
1978-1996 omitting 1983 data.
Our chosen speci¯cation, which the results below focus on, models participa-
tion and wages as a function of the three education groupings, cohort dummies,
a cubic trend, and region, plus interactions between the cubic trend and edu-
cation, cubic trend and cohort, education and cohort, linear trend by education
and cohort, and a quadratic trend times region. This speci¯cation was chosen in
comparison to a number of alternatives through a standard speci¯cation search.20
Further details of the validation of this model are presented in the model valida-
tion section below.
The necessity of the inclusion of the interaction terms means that our pre-
ferred speci¯cation of the log wage equation departs from the full proportionality
hypothesis as set out in Section 2. The additional interactions between cohort
and education and trend which we introduce could re°ect many di®erences in
minimum educational standards across cohorts such as the systematic raising of
the minimum school leaving age over the postwar period in the UK. Meanwhile
the prices of di®erent (education level) skills are allowed to evolve in di®erent
ways, by including an interaction between the education dummies and the trend
terms. The selectivity correction using the inverse Mills ratio from the participa-
tion equation is interacted with marital status and by education group, because
20It is also in accordance with much of the literature on the evolution of British male wages
(see Meghir and Whitehouse (1996), for example).
19¯rst, the way out-of-work income is de¯ned implies that it attains di®erent lev-
els for single and married people, and second, it is quite possible that selection
may have di®erent e®ects at di®erent skill levels. As Table 3.3 shows the bene¯t
income terms are strongly signi¯cant in the participation equation and the Mills
ratio, education, cohort and trend terms are all signi¯cant in the wage equation.
3.2.1. Aggregate Wages and Corrections: Overall Sample Measures
We now consider aggregate wages and the corrections due to heterogeneity,
the distribution of hours and labor participation.21 We plot the values over time,
to allow a quick assessment of the pathof aggregate wages and the relative impor-
tance of the corrections, as well as how well the corrected aggregate wage matches
up with the mean log wage implied by the micro-level wage equations. We have
found this graphical approach much more straightforward than trying to directly
analyze the numerous estimated coe±cients underlying the graphs.
Overall aggregate wages and the various correction terms are plotted in Figure
3.1. Panel (a) of Figure 3.1 displays the behavior of all the measures of wages we
look at over the entire period. First there is the selectivity-adjusted prediction
from the micro-level wage equation. Second, there is the aggregate measure of
wages calculated as the log of average wages for those in work.22 The remaining
three lines shown on the ¯gure give the (cumulative) application of the correction
terms to aggregate wages. First is the correction for the distribution of hours.
As we may have expected given the relatively stable pattern of hours worked,
this has little impact on the time-series evolution of wages. Second is the selec-
tion correction for covariance between wages and participation. This has a more
21The disturbance \variance" terms are computed by standard variance estimates from the
structure of the estimated truncated regression.
22This is also calculated from the FES and corresponds closely to the measure of `average
earnings' which media commentators in the UK have focused on.
20dramatic e®ect, with growing gaps over time associated with large decreases in
participation. Finally, we apply the correction for the heterogeneity (dispersion)
of individual wages. This gives the impact ofthe increasingheterogeneity inwages
that is separated from participation e®ects.
In sum, this ¯nal series gives the aggregate wage after all corrections. For
comparison, we plot the mean log wage implied by the micro regressions (adjusted
for participation, or omitting the selection term). Finally, in order to see the
relative growth of the various series more clearly, panel (b) of Figure 3.1 shows
exactly thesame series for the micromodel prediction, the aggregate wage measure
andthefully-correctedaggregate series, butrebasedto 1978.23 Plotting eachseries
starting at the 1978 level makes it easier to see what the implementation of the
adjustment formula does to the measured aggregate hourly earnings growth.
A key evaluation of our framework is whether the fully corrected aggregate
series lines up with the selectivity-adjusted micromodel prediction. Panel (a) of
Figure 3.1 shows that there is a very close correspondence between the series.
Later on we use bootstrap methods to check whether any di®erence which does
arise between the micromodel and the corrected aggregate series is statistically
signi¯cant.
Several features of this ¯gure are noteworthy. For instance, the direction of
movement of the uncorrected log aggregate wage does not always mirror that of
the mean micro log wage. During the recession of the early 1980s, aggregate
wages grow rather more than the corrected micromodel wage. Whilst there is a
reasonably close correspondence between the trend of the two lines in the latter
half of the 1980s, in the 1990s we ¯nd that there is a reasonably substantial
increase inlog aggregate wages but essentially no growthinthe corrected measure.
23That is, the 1978 values are subtracted from all values in the series.
21The lower panel of Figure 3.1, which rebases to 1979, shows these patterns even
more vividly. Correcting for selection over the period reduces our estimate of real
aggregate wage growth from more than 30% to less than 20%.
3.2.2. Wage Measures by Education Group
Next we break our sample up by the three education groups used in the
analysis. We plot the wage series de¯ned just as before but this time we are
taking the micromodel prediction, the `aggregate' wage series and the corrections
to the aggregate series within education group for each year. Hence we have three
plots in Figure 3.2, which present the path of the series for each education group.
For the low education group | those that left full time education at age 16
or younger | the picture is particularly clear. This is presented in the ¯rst panel
of Figure 3.2. Controlling for the biases induced by shifts in participation rates
over the 1980s and 1990s reduces our estimate of average wage growth for this
group from over 20% to around 10%. The corrected aggregate series and the
selectivity-adjusted micromodel prediction appear to line up very well here.
For those individuals with more schooling, presented in the subsequent two
panels of Figure 3.2, the ¯t between the two series is less good largely because
these are smaller subsamples, and so the data on wages for them is more noisy.
Nevertheless, there appears to be evidence that selection e®ects do bias measured
wage growth estimates upwards for both of the better-educated groups.
3.2.3. Education Returns by Cohort
Disaggregating wages by education and cohort reveals another important
aspect of the impact of participation on aggregate wages. As we noted in the
introduction the employment rate fell sharply over this period with strong cohort
22di®erences. Figure 3.3(a)-(c) graphs the estimated returns with and without the
correction factors for three di®erent cohorts: those born between 1935 and 1944
(who were the oldest cohort with representatives in every sample year), those
born between 1945-1954 and those born between 1955 and 1964 (who were the
youngest). It is very noticeable how strongly the returns increased in the early
1980s but equally interesting how the increase is only maintained into the 1990s
for the youngest cohort.
The impact of selection e®ects on returns are clearly important. In Figure
3.4 (a)-(c) the time series variation in the selection bias term is presented for
each cohort. This follows the cyclical pattern of employment - as one might
expect given the analysis presented so far. But what is rather more interesting is
that, although selection e®ects always lead to an underestimate of the return, the
impact of increasing dispersion is not so clear-cut. Dispersion is often greater for
the higher education group, and also rises more quickly over time for the better
educated. Consequently the dispersion correction can actually reduce the over all
return. For example, in the case of the older cohort Figure 3.3(a) shows that at
the end of the 1980s and through the 1990s the dispersion correction is enough to
turn around the selection e®ect.
3.2.4. A Regional Breakdown
There are several further breakdowns of the FES wage data which are inter-
esting to look at in our framework in addition to the split by educational group.
Regional di®erences in real wages and labor market participation are characteris-
tic of Britain as they are of many European economies. We examine di®erences in
the path of measured average wages and the wages predicted by our micromodel,
and corrections to the average measure for two broad regions, the `North' and the
23`South' of Britain24.
As the raw earningsindices plottedinpanels(b) and (c) of Figure 3.5show, the
two regions experienced markeddi®erences in male wages over this period. Figure
3.5 (a) shows that participation levels and changes have also been very di®erent.
In 1978 participation for the South was only around 3-4 percentage points higher
than it was inthe North. By 1983this North-South gap had widenedto more than
10% as the North was a®ected a lot more severely by the decline of traditional
manufacturingsectors than was the South(mainly because the old industries were
mainly located in the North). Growth in participation in the late 1980s in the
North then closed some of the increase in the gap, and in the 1990s recession both
regions appear to have been a®ected a lot more equally. Comparing Figure 3.5(b)
and (c) shows that wages grew faster on average in the South than they did in
the North over the 1980s; in the 1990s the experience of both regions has been
relatively similar.
For the Northin Figure 3.5 (b), there is much slower growthin the early eight-
ies than the aggregate ¯gures portray and a reasonably continuous divergence
between the uncorrected aggregate wage measure and the micromodel prediction
from 1979 until 1995. The corrected aggregate measure tracks the micromodel
prediction closely for the most part. In the South in Figure 3.5 (c), the aggregate
measure and the micromodel prediction grow at a similar rate between 1979 and
1990, although there are some °uctuations around the trend for the aggregate
measure. After 1990, the gap between the two measures opens out as falling par-
ticipation increases the importance of selection. The corrected index indicates
that average wages actually fell back in the South. Again there is a close cor-
24More precisely, our de¯nition of the `North' comprises the FES standard regions Northeast,
Northwest, Yorkshire & Humberside, West Midlands, Wales and Scotland. The `South' com-
prises London and the Southeast. The Southwest, East Midlands and East Anglia are omitted.
24respondence of the corrected aggregate measure and the micromodel prediction
although there is some divergence between the two in the mid-80s.
Figure 3.5(d) presents the uncorrected and corrected South-North di®erential.
Biases induced by di®erential employment behavior in the North and the South of
Britain appear to indicate that the behavior ofindividual wages was very di®erent
from that which would be surmised from the aggregate ¯gures.
3.3. Model Validation
Our model and the econometric assumptions underlying have been tested as
far as is possible in order to ascertain their plausibility. The validationprocedures
undertaken include (a) a check to see whether the corrections to aggregate wages
line them up su±ciently well with the predictions from the selectivity-adjusted
micromodel, (b) relaxing the normality assumption on the unobservables by esti-
mating an analogous model using semiparametric methods, and (c) plots of the
predicted indices from the probit and the wage equation to assess whether the
distributions of observable attributes conform to normality. We now assess each
of these in turn.
3.3.1. Bootstrapping the Accuracy of the Model Fit
To assess the accuracy with which the corrections which we make to the
aggregate average male log wage series `line up' against the prediction from our
micro-model ofwages (withthe selectivity correctionincluded), we used bootstrap
methods to simulate the di®erence between the two measures25. The results are
shown in Figure 3.6.26 They show that the di®erence between the two measures
is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in most of the years covered by the sample.
25The number of repetitions in the bootstrap simulation was 500.
26Very similar, broken down by educational group, are available on request.
25Occasionally the di®erence is signi¯cantly positive (indicating that the corrected
aggregate measure is higher than the micromodel prediction), but in general the
corrections to the aggregate measure and the selectivity-adjusted micromodel line
up very well. This provides a very positive validation of the model framework.
3.3.2. Semiparametric Estimation
Our model, as set out in Section 2, makes the assumption that the unob-
servable factors a®ecting participation and wages are normally distributed. This
can of course be called into question. The properties of the estimator rely on
the parametric distributional assumptions on the joint distribution of the errors.
However, given our exclusion assumption on the continuous out-of-work income
variable, semiparametric estimation can proceed in a fairly straightforward man-
ner. To estimate theslope parameters we follow the suggestionof Robinson(1988)
which is developed in Ahn and Powell (1993). These techniques are explored in
a useful application to labor supply by Newey, Powell and Walker (1990). In
Figure 3.7 we graph a comparison between the predicted wages estimated using
semiparametric techniques and the wage predictions from the selectivity-adjusted
micromodelwhichwe use. Bootstrap con¯dencebands (95%)refer totheparamet-
ric selectivity model. There is a very close correspondence between the predictions
from the parametric micromodel and the semiparametric version. We conclude
that the assumption of normality of the unobservables in the model is not unduly
restrictive.
3.3.3. Normality of the Wage and Participation Indexes
In addition to checking the validity of the normality assumption on the un-
observables, we are also interested in the normality of the probit index and of the
26¯tted wage distribution from the selectivity-adjusted wage equation. Taking the
participation probit ¯rst of all, Figure 3.8 plots the distribution of the standard-
ized probit index b ®0z over all years of the sample (plots for individual years are all
quite similar). The index is distributed roughly normally although with a slight
negative skew.27
We also checked the validity of the normality assumption on log wages by
plotting the standardized wage predictions from the model overlaid with a stan-
dard normal curve. This is shown in Figure 3.9. The distribution is not obviously
skewed left or right, and there appears to be a higher density of observations
around the mean than is the case with a standard normal. In any case, while
these plots do not show exact concordance with the normal distribution assump-
tions, we feel that the proximity of the empirical distributions to normal helps
explainthe close correspondence between correctedaggregate wages and the mean
wages implied by the micro regressions.28
4. Conclusion
This aim of this paper has been to provide a systematic assessment of the
way changes in labor market participation a®ect our interpretation of aggregate
real wages. We have developed and implemented an empirical framework for un-
derstandingthis relationship whichreduces to the calculationof three aggregation
factors. These can be interpreted as correction terms re°ecting changes in selec-
tion due to participation, changes in the distribution of returns and changes in
27For further validation, kernel regressions of participation on b ®0z show anormal shape, details
of which are available from the authors on request.
28While there are some visible departures from normality, the entireimpact of those departures
on the analysis is summarized in the di®erence between the plots from the corrected aggregate
measure and the micro model. As we have noted above these plots are extremely close.
27hours of work, respectively. We have shown that they do a remarkably good job of
explaining the di®erences between individual and aggregate wages in the British
context.
British data was used for three reasons. First, there have been signi¯cant
changes in labor market participation over the last two decades. Participation
rates for men have seen a secular decline and have displayed strong cyclical varia-
tion. The secular decline is largely re°ected in increasing decline in participation
among older men across cohorts while the cyclical variation shows strong regional
variation. This phenomena is common to many other developed economies. Sec-
ond, in Britain, there are strong changes in real wages and the distribution of
real wages over this sample period. Third, there is important exogenous variation
in certain components of out of work incomes across time and across individuals
that allows the identi¯cation of the correction terms.
The empirical analysis of aggregate wages is shown to provide a coherent pic-
ture of the relationship between individual male wages and aggregated wages
over this period. Moreover, the statistical model adopted appears to accord well
with the empirical facts. The correction terms explain the di®erences between
log aggregate wages and the average of log wages implied by our analysis. The
di®erences are interesting and have valuable implications. They show an impor-
tant role for wage dispersion and for selection in charaterising the distortion in
the measurement of wage growth from aggregate data. Most noteworthy is how
mean individual log-wages are largely °at throughout the early 1990's, whereas
measured aggregate wages are rising. As such, we see our estimates as giving clear
evidence that the biases in log aggregate real wages are substantial and can lead
to misleading depictions of the progress of wages of individual male workers.
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A. Appendix A: Aggregation Results
Appendix A1: Lemma A1
Our formulations of aggregate wages are based on results on aggregation
of nonlinear relationships over normal and lognormal distributions. We make use
of several standard formulae familiar from the analysis of selection bias, as well
as some further results presented in Lemma A1. While these further results are
rather basic, we could not ¯nd speci¯c references to them in the literature, and so
we have included a proof below. Finally, we close with the correspondences used
to derive the speci¯c results of the main text.









































u ´ U ¡ ¹U



















































where Á[¢] is the standard normal density function. Consequently, we have











where ¸[¢] = Á[¢]=©[¢] is the inverse Mill's ratio.29
29Recall that our notational convention is that E (¢jI) denotes expectation conditional on
I = 1.
31Applying (A.4) to the case with U = a +bV gives














This concludes the basic selection formulae that we use. To study log-normal
variables (wages in our applicaition), we require:



















lnW = U and I = 1[V < 0]:
Then:
A.




































Proof of Lemma A1:





















where ½UV = ¾UV=¾U¾V:














































This term is simpli¯ed by completing the square in the exponent of the latter

















































































Collecting all of the terms gives































33Dividing by the formula for E[WI] by E[I] gives the result for E [WjI], or (A.6).
For part B, using (A.2), we have that




























































































































where the third equality follows from completing the square as in part A, and the
last equality follows from direct integration as in (A.3) above. Now, collecting
terms gives












































Equation (A.7) follows from dividing by E [I]. This completes the proof of the
Lemma A1.
The formulations (A.6)-(A.7) can be rewritten in terms of the unconditional





For instance, (A.6) can be rewritten as an adjustment to the unconditional mean
as











and the other equations can be similarly recast.
To derive the results in the text we apply the following correspondence
U = ¯0 + ¯
0x+ ²;




For the individual formulations of Section 2.3, we apply the formulae to the pop-
ulation distributions conditional on the values of x and z. This gives
¹U = ¯0+ ¯
0
x










For the macroeconomic equations of Section 2.4, we apply the same correspon-
dence, slightly rewritten as




(x¡ E(x)) + ²
V = ¡®0 ¡ ®
0E(z) ¡ ®
0 (z ¡E (z))¡ º:
(A.12)
35and apply the formulae to the (unconditional) expectations over the joint distri-
bution of x and z and the disturbances ² and º: This gives
¹U = ¯0 +¯
0
E(x)















that are substituted into the general aggregation results.
Appendix: A2: Some Further Derivations
The following formulae are needed as intermediate steps in the derivation of
our main aggregation bias terms. First, noting that h = h0 ¡ °V, we have



















h0 + °®0 +°®
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Carrying out a similar calculation on the unconditional (overall) distribution
gives













h0 +°®0 + °®
0E(z) +°¯


































s_zero log of simulated TAXBEN out-of-work income, single men
m_zero log of simulated TAXBEN out-of-work income, married men
(asssuming both partners not working)
no_zero simulated TAXBEN out-of-work income zero or missing
spoused spouse’s education dummy (=1 if left school after 16)
married marital status dummy (=1 if married)
ed17 education dummy (=1 if left FT education aged 17-18)






c1919_34 cohort dummy: born 1919-34
c1935_44 cohort dummy: born 1935-44
c1955_64 cohort dummy: born 1955-64









c19_tr, c19_tr2, c19_tr3 interactions: c1919_34*trend, *trend
2, *trend
3
c35_tr, c35_tr2, c35_tr3 interactions: c1935_44*trend, *trend
2, *trend
3
c55_tr, c55_tr2, c55_tr3 interactions: c1955_64*trend, *trend
2, *trend
3
c65_tr, c65_tr2, c65_tr3 interactions: c1965_77*trend, *trend
2, *trend
3
ed17_tr, ed17_tr2, ed17_tr3 interactions: ed17*trend, *trend
2, *trend
3












reg_d2 region: Yorkshire & Humberside
reg_d3 region: North Western
reg_d4 region: East Midlands
reg_d5 region: West Midlands
reg_d6 region: East Anglia
reg_d7 region: Greater London
reg_d8 region: South East (except Greater London)
reg_d9 region: South Western
reg_d10 region: Wales
reg1_t, reg2_t, … reg10_t interactions: regional dummies*trend
reg1_t2, reg2_t2,… reg10_t2 interactions: regional dummies*trend
2
millsi Inverse Mills’ ratio * single




dependent variable = working dummy
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =  71901
                                                        LR chi2(78)   =9862.99
                                                        Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -28335.311                             Pseudo R2     = 0.1482
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    work |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    sdbz |  -.0685447    .002333   -29.07   0.000    .90383  -.073117 -.063972
    mdbz |  -.1377394   .0036845   -36.33   0.000    3.5209  -.144961 -.130518
  no_dbz*|   .1142545   .0058884     8.82   0.000   .025938   .102713  .125796
 spoused*|   .0521162   .0034607    13.59   0.000   .200748   .045333  .058899
 married*|   .7129586   .0245823    25.14   0.000   .724441   .664778  .761139
    ed17*|   .0636748   .0222094     2.44   0.014   .138997   .020145  .107204
    ed19*|   .0454274   .0239729     1.70   0.088   .134532  -.001559  .092413
   trend |  -.0310929   .0065642    -4.74   0.000   9.82081  -.043959 -.018227
 trend_2 |   .0342862     .00684     5.01   0.000   12.6716    .02088  .047692
 trend_3 |  -.0118253   .0021916    -5.39   0.000   18.3757  -.016121  -.00753
c1919_34*|    .010342   .0199493     0.51   0.611    .14762  -.028758  .049442
c1935_44*|   .0265571     .01921     1.32   0.186   .207744  -.011094  .064208
c1955_64*|  -.1775103   .0291358    -7.00   0.000   .254948  -.234615 -.120405
c1965_77*|  -.9903533   .0033246    -9.55   0.000   .119525  -.996869 -.983837
c19_ed17*|  -.1167392   .0490357    -2.83   0.005   .010348  -.212847 -.020631
c35_ed17*|  -.0401304   .0361052    -1.21   0.228   .020973  -.110895  .030634
c55_ed17*|  -.0094561   .0277547    -0.35   0.728   .045368  -.063854  .044942
c65_ed17*|  -.1190364   .0759068    -1.86   0.063   .023769  -.267811  .029738
c19_ed19*|   .0358679   .0318798     1.00   0.316   .008206  -.026615  .098351
c35_ed19*|   .0109473   .0300164     0.35   0.723   .020904  -.047884  .069778
c55_ed19*|   .0410211   .0212199     1.71   0.088   .042572  -.000569  .082611
c65_ed19*|  -.1250612   .0989909    -1.51   0.132    .01751   -.31908  .068957
  c19_tr |  -.0180338   .0101164    -1.78   0.075   .831574  -.037861  .001794
  c35_tr |    .003205   .0085802     0.37   0.709   1.94195  -.013612  .020022
  c55_tr |   .0098374   .0083916     1.17   0.241   2.72756   -.00661  .026285
  c65_tr |   .4601365   .0538138     8.55   0.000   1.75589   .354663   .56561
 ed17_tr |   .0115365   .0101206     1.14   0.254    1.4791    -.0083  .031373
ed17_tr2 |  -.0087879   .0109401    -0.80   0.422   1.98007   -.03023  .012654
ed17_tr3 |   .0018958   .0034845     0.54   0.586   2.92933  -.004934  .008725
 ed19_tr |     .00986    .010686     0.92   0.356   1.48225  -.011084  .030804
ed19_tr2 |  -.0002327   .0116365    -0.02   0.984   2.02982   -.02304  .022575
ed19_tr3 |  -.0018782   .0036944    -0.51   0.611   3.05034  -.009119  .005363
c19_17_t |   .0032464   .0037791     0.86   0.390   .063393   -.00416  .010653
c35_17_t |  -.0016828   .0025082    -0.67   0.502   .198718  -.006599  .003233
c55_17_t |  -.0006529   .0022063    -0.30   0.767   .499659  -.004977  .003671
c65_17_t |   .0064879   .0035833     1.81   0.070   .348173  -.000535  .013511
c19_19_t |  -.0039854   .0044121    -0.90   0.366   .050347  -.012633  .004662
c35_19_t |  -.0026946   .0025551    -1.05   0.292   .206826  -.007702  .002313
c55_19_t |  -.0032974   .0021823    -1.51   0.131   .507768  -.007575   .00098
c65_19_t |   .0068479   .0043329     1.58   0.114   .275226  -.001644   .01534
 c19_tr2 |   .0026269   .0138457     0.19   0.850   .693711   -.02451  .029764
 c19_tr3 |    .000708    .005572     0.13   0.899   .704376  -.010213  .011629
 c35_tr2 |  -.0149225   .0096857    -1.54   0.123   2.42231  -.033906  .004061
 c35_tr3 |   .0050972   .0031588     1.61   0.107   3.42328  -.001094  .011288
 c55_tr2 |   .0030662   .0093429     0.33   0.743    3.6035  -.015246  .021378
 c55_tr3 |  -.0014964   .0030189    -0.50   0.620   5.26727  -.007413  .004421
 c65_tr2 |  -.3258694   .0407671    -7.99   0.000   2.70399  -.405771 -.245967
 c65_tr3 |    .076083   .0100139     7.60   0.000    4.3189   .056456   .09571
  reg_d1*|  -.0352825   .0239148    -1.58   0.114   .064784  -.082155   .01159
  reg_d2*|   .0039765   .0194331     0.20   0.839   .093351  -.034112  .042065
  reg_d3*|   .0101134   .0179885     0.55   0.582   .114324  -.025143   .04537
  reg_d4*|   .0713913   .0148853     3.78   0.000   .076341   .042217  .100566
  reg_d5*|   .0445241    .016201     2.45   0.014   .097314   .012771  .076278
  reg_d6*|   .0043725   .0276139     0.16   0.876   .037232   -.04975  .058495
  reg_d7*|   .0306896   .0169073     1.69   0.092   .104783  -.002448  .063827
  reg_d8*|   .0635671   .0142713     3.91   0.000   .187257   .035596  .091538
  reg_d9*|    .048895   .0171858     2.47   0.013    .07808   .015211  .082579
 reg_d10*|  -.0039396   .0231322    -0.17   0.864   .052433  -.049278  .041399
  reg1_t |   .0048434   .0046909     1.03   0.302   .625805  -.004351  .014037
  reg2_t |   .0033078   .0044334     0.75   0.456   .920307  -.005382  .011997
  reg3_t |   .0007642   .0041897     0.18   0.855   1.11781  -.007447  .008976
  reg4_t |  -.0038878   .0050102    -0.78   0.438   .763369  -.013708  .005932
  reg5_t |  -.0050552   .0044739    -1.13   0.259   .940015  -.013824  .003713
  reg6_t |   .0149104   .0062843     2.37   0.018   .373861   .002593  .027227
  reg7_t |   .0076762   .0043746     1.75   0.079   1.00405  -.000898   .01625
  reg8_t |   .0069887   .0040575     1.72   0.085   1.85591  -.000964  .014941
  reg9_t |   .0043744   .0049013     0.89   0.372   .803104  -.005232  .013981
 reg10_t |  -.0024889   .0051066    -0.49   0.626   .499798  -.012498   .00752
 reg1_t2 |  -.0028384   .0022722    -1.25   0.212   .800445  -.007292  .001615
 reg2_t2 |  -.0012655   .0021394    -0.59   0.554   1.19083  -.005459  .002928
 reg3_t2 |  -.0003293   .0020187    -0.16   0.870   1.43816  -.004286  .003627
 reg4_t2 |   .0008202   .0023751     0.35   0.730   .991075  -.003835  .005475
 reg5_t2 |   .0023763   .0021487     1.11   0.269     1.196  -.001835  .006588
 reg6_t2 |  -.0066026   .0030037    -2.20   0.028   .488365   -.01249 -.000716
 reg7_t2 |  -.0057894   .0021137    -2.74   0.006   1.28218  -.009932 -.001647
 reg8_t2 |  -.0040872   .0019426    -2.10   0.035    2.4032  -.007895  -.00028
 reg9_t2 |  -.0023909   .0023291    -1.03   0.305   1.06661  -.006956  .002174
reg10_t2 |   .0012647   .0024688     0.51   0.608   .634458  -.003574  .006104
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
  obs. P |    .825677
 pred. P |   .8676316  (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1







dependent variable = log real wage
  Source |       SS       df       MS                  Number of obs =   59367
---------+------------------------------               F( 76, 59290) =  319.30
   Model |  4019.50634    76  52.8882414               Prob > F      =  0.0000
Residual |  9820.73938 59290  .165639052               R-squared     =  0.2904
---------+------------------------------               Adj R-squared =  0.2895
   Total |  13840.2457 59366  .233134214               Root MSE      =  .40699
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   logrw |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
  millsi |   .2008087   .0146226     13.733   0.000       .1721483    .2294691
  millma |   .1413254   .0191778      7.369   0.000       .1037368     .178914
 married |   .2323243   .0081163     28.624   0.000       .2164162    .2482323
    ed17 |   .1745378   .0286755      6.087   0.000       .1183337    .2307418
    ed19 |   .2493489   .0281713      8.851   0.000        .194133    .3045648
   trend |   .0093508   .0079933      1.170   0.242      -.0063161    .0250177
 trend_2 |   .0139255   .0084488      1.648   0.099      -.0026343    .0304853
 trend_3 |  -.0063356   .0027523     -2.302   0.021      -.0117301   -.0009411
c1919_34 |   .0172652   .0232878      0.741   0.458      -.0283789    .0629093
c1935_44 |    .038349   .0224502      1.708   0.088      -.0056535    .0823515
c1955_64 |  -.0739112   .0249322     -2.964   0.003      -.1227784   -.0250439
c1965_77 |  -2.130157   .3590534     -5.933   0.000      -2.833903   -1.426411
c19_ed17 |   .1411372   .0354563      3.981   0.000       .0716428    .2106316
c35_ed17 |   .1132332   .0292551      3.871   0.000       .0558931    .1705733
c55_ed17 |  -.1517167   .0270713     -5.604   0.000      -.2047765    -.098657
c65_ed17 |  -.2455389   .0667992     -3.676   0.000      -.3764656   -.1146122
c19_ed19 |   .3856498   .0367668     10.489   0.000       .3135868    .4577128
c35_ed19 |   .1574245   .0293621      5.361   0.000       .0998747    .2149744
c55_ed19 |  -.2308073   .0289465     -7.974   0.000      -.2875427    -.174072
c65_ed19 |  -.3278073   .0912167     -3.594   0.000      -.5065924   -.1490223
  c19_tr |   .0017094   .0125377      0.136   0.892      -.0228646    .0262834
  c35_tr |   .0073628   .0099587      0.739   0.460      -.0121563     .026882
  c55_tr |   -.032532   .0100916     -3.224   0.001      -.0523116   -.0127524
  c65_tr |    .408846   .0842272      4.854   0.000       .2437603    .5739317
 ed17_tr |   .0018844   .0107116      0.176   0.860      -.0191103    .0228791
ed17_tr2 |    .015739    .012081      1.303   0.193      -.0079397    .0394178
ed17_tr3 |  -.0065763   .0039533     -1.664   0.096      -.0143247    .0011721
 ed19_tr |   .0211364   .0108976      1.940   0.052      -.0002229    .0424958
ed19_tr2 |   .0089118   .0123286      0.723   0.470      -.0152523    .0330759
ed19_tr3 |  -.0063701   .0040296     -1.581   0.114      -.0142682    .0015279
c19_17_t |  -.0063433   .0047188     -1.344   0.179      -.0155921    .0029056
c35_17_t |  -.0038804    .002766     -1.403   0.161      -.0093019    .0015411
c55_17_t |   .0041489   .0023564      1.761   0.078      -.0004697    .0087674
c65_17_t |   .0028379   .0046284      0.613   0.540      -.0062337    .0119095
c19_19_t |  -.0247369   .0049201     -5.028   0.000      -.0343804   -.0150935
c35_19_t |  -.0086038   .0027035     -3.182   0.001      -.0139027   -.0033048
c55_19_t |   .0091267   .0024078      3.790   0.000       .0044074    .0138461
c65_19_t |   .0059935   .0059335      1.010   0.312      -.0056361    .0176231
 c19_tr2 |  -.0117648   .0185694     -0.634   0.526       -.048161    .0246314
 c19_tr3 |   .0004788    .007996      0.060   0.952      -.0151934    .0161509
 c35_tr2 |  -.0146516   .0118279     -1.239   0.215      -.0378344    .0085311
 c35_tr3 |   .0034335   .0039949      0.859   0.390      -.0043965    .0112634
 c55_tr2 |   .0369395    .011481      3.217   0.001       .0144368    .0594423
 c55_tr3 |  -.0101353   .0037594     -2.696   0.007      -.0175037   -.0027669
 c65_tr2 |  -.3020248   .0637196     -4.740   0.000      -.4269155   -.1771342
 c65_tr3 |   .0732498   .0155956      4.697   0.000       .0426823    .1038173
  reg_d1 |   .0136009   .0265299      0.513   0.608      -.0383979    .0655996
  reg_d2 |   .0216178   .0238727      0.906   0.365      -.0251728    .0684084
  reg_d3 |   .0245066   .0228085      1.074   0.283      -.0201982    .0692114
  reg_d4 |   .0097633   .0252544      0.387   0.699      -.0397354     .059262
  reg_d5 |   .0297409   .0233063      1.276   0.202      -.0159394    .0754213
  reg_d6 |  -.0156145   .0316444     -0.493   0.622      -.0776376    .0464086
  reg_d7 |   .0712609   .0228072      3.124   0.002       .0265587    .1159631
  reg_d8 |   .0776007   .0204878      3.788   0.000       .0374446    .1177568
  reg_d9 |  -.0692193   .0250961     -2.758   0.006      -.1184078   -.0200308
 reg_d10 |    .033723   .0282949      1.192   0.233      -.0217351    .0891811
  reg1_t |  -.0039414   .0064961     -0.607   0.544      -.0166737    .0087909
  reg2_t |  -.0032615   .0057809     -0.564   0.573      -.0145921     .008069
  reg3_t |  -.0002022   .0055335     -0.037   0.971      -.0110479    .0106435
  reg4_t |   .0009392   .0060478      0.155   0.877      -.0109145     .012793
  reg5_t |  -.0053226    .005658     -0.941   0.347      -.0164123    .0057672
  reg6_t |   .0039001   .0075573      0.516   0.606      -.0109122    .0187124
  reg7_t |   .0237002   .0055971      4.234   0.000       .0127299    .0346704
  reg8_t |   .0141669   .0049477      2.863   0.004       .0044693    .0238645
  reg9_t |   .0191713   .0059616      3.216   0.001       .0074864    .0308561
 reg10_t |   -.014574   .0069052     -2.111   0.035      -.0281082   -.0010398
 reg1_t2 |   .0010914   .0032927      0.331   0.740      -.0053622    .0075451
 reg2_t2 |   .0010626   .0029054      0.366   0.715      -.0046321    .0067573
 reg3_t2 |   .0002216   .0027815      0.080   0.937      -.0052302    .0056734
 reg4_t2 |   -.001229   .0030249     -0.406   0.685      -.0071579    .0046999
 reg5_t2 |   .0018275   .0028563      0.640   0.522       -.003771    .0074259
 reg6_t2 |  -.0009432   .0037756     -0.250   0.803      -.0083434    .0064569
 reg7_t2 |  -.0101735   .0028392     -3.583   0.000      -.0157384   -.0046087
 reg8_t2 |  -.0047758   .0024865     -1.921   0.055      -.0096494    .0000978
 reg9_t2 |    -.00826   .0029638     -2.787   0.005      -.0140691    -.002451
reg10_t2 |    .005746   .0034721      1.655   0.098      -.0010593    .0125513






dependent variable = log real wage
  Source |       SS       df       MS                  Number of obs =   59367
---------+------------------------------               F( 74, 59292) =  323.94
   Model |  3984.60015    74   53.845948               Prob > F      =  0.0000
Residual |  9855.64557 59292  .166222181               R-squared     =  0.2879
---------+------------------------------               Adj R-squared =  0.2870
   Total |  13840.2457 59366  .233134214               Root MSE      =   .4077
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   logrw |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 married |   .1816041    .004433     40.966   0.000       .1729153    .1902929
    ed17 |   .1641939    .028713      5.718   0.000       .1079164    .2204715
    ed19 |   .2411035   .0282147      8.545   0.000       .1858027    .2964044
   trend |   .0171608   .0079644      2.155   0.031       .0015506     .032771
 trend_2 |   .0076859   .0084309      0.912   0.362      -.0088387    .0242105
 trend_3 |  -.0045346   .0027478     -1.650   0.099      -.0099202     .000851
c1919_34 |   .0177044   .0233215      0.759   0.448      -.0280059    .0634146
c1935_44 |   .0414158   .0224858      1.842   0.066      -.0026565     .085488
c1955_64 |  -.0830804   .0248699     -3.341   0.001      -.1318254   -.0343353
c1965_76 |  -2.024938   .3595664     -5.632   0.000      -2.729689   -1.320186
c19_ed17 |   .1555518   .0354903      4.383   0.000       .0859907    .2251128
c35_ed17 |   .1212828   .0293009      4.139   0.000       .0638529    .1787128
c55_ed17 |  -.1579711   .0271033     -5.828   0.000      -.2110938   -.1048485
c65_ed17 |  -.2435678   .0667881     -3.647   0.000      -.3744728   -.1126628
c19_ed19 |   .3818706   .0368296     10.369   0.000       .3096843    .4540569
c35_ed19 |   .1585953   .0294135      5.392   0.000       .1009447    .2162459
c55_ed19 |  -.2293752   .0289964     -7.910   0.000      -.2862083   -.1725421
c65_ed19 |  -.3025943   .0912816     -3.315   0.001      -.4815066   -.1236821
  c19_tr |   .0032707   .0125587      0.260   0.795      -.0213444    .0278858
  c35_tr |   .0048689   .0099739      0.488   0.625      -.0146801    .0244178
  c55_tr |  -.0331251   .0101088     -3.277   0.001      -.0529384   -.0133118
  c65_tr |   .3721684   .0843284      4.413   0.000       .2068844    .5374524
 ed17_tr |  -.0008072   .0107223     -0.075   0.940       -.021823    .0202087
ed17_tr2 |    .017821   .0120971      1.473   0.141      -.0058894    .0415314
ed17_tr3 |  -.0071567    .003959     -1.808   0.071      -.0149163    .0006029
 ed19_tr |   .0195526   .0109047      1.793   0.073      -.0018208    .0409259
ed19_tr2 |   .0082498   .0123423      0.668   0.504      -.0159412    .0324408
ed19_tr3 |  -.0057802   .0040344     -1.433   0.152      -.0136877    .0021273
c19_17_t |  -.0070538   .0047267     -1.492   0.136      -.0163181    .0022104
c35_17_t |  -.0036529   .0027702     -1.319   0.187      -.0090824    .0017767
c55_17_t |   .0046529     .00236      1.972   0.049       .0000272    .0092786
c65_17_t |    .001682   .0046319      0.363   0.717      -.0073966    .0107606
c19_19_t |  -.0248123   .0049288     -5.034   0.000      -.0344727   -.0151519
c35_19_t |  -.0084459   .0027082     -3.119   0.002      -.0137539   -.0031379
c55_19_t |   .0088351    .002412      3.663   0.000       .0041076    .0135625
c65_19_t |   .0034379   .0059391      0.579   0.563      -.0082028    .0150786
 c19_tr2 |  -.0107356   .0186018     -0.577   0.564      -.0471953     .025724
 c19_tr3 |   .0004268     .00801      0.053   0.958      -.0152729    .0161265
 c35_tr2 |  -.0115291   .0118448     -0.973   0.330      -.0347449    .0116867
 c35_tr3 |   .0028208   .0040014      0.705   0.481      -.0050219    .0106636
 c55_tr2 |   .0395802   .0114992      3.442   0.001       .0170417    .0621187
 c55_tr3 |  -.0113121   .0037648     -3.005   0.003      -.0186912    -.003933
 c65_tr2 |  -.2659035    .063777     -4.169   0.000      -.3909066   -.1409004
 c65_tr3 |   .0630552   .0156058      4.040   0.000       .0324677    .0936427
  reg_d1 |   .0223311   .0265622      0.841   0.401      -.0297308    .0743931
  reg_d2 |   .0224189   .0239145      0.937   0.349      -.0244537    .0692914
  reg_d3 |    .024818   .0228485      1.086   0.277      -.0199651     .069601
  reg_d4 |  -.0018827   .0252621     -0.075   0.941      -.0513964    .0476311
  reg_d5 |   .0210079   .0233296      0.900   0.368      -.0247181     .066734
  reg_d6 |  -.0143533   .0316997     -0.453   0.651      -.0764849    .0477783
  reg_d7 |   .0686842   .0228437      3.007   0.003       .0239105     .113458
  reg_d8 |   .0695135   .0204957      3.392   0.001       .0293418    .1096852
  reg_d9 |  -.0741253   .0251248     -2.950   0.003      -.1233701   -.0248805
 reg_d10 |   .0323453   .0283444      1.141   0.254      -.0232099    .0879005
  reg1_t |  -.0052846   .0065063     -0.812   0.417       -.018037    .0074677
  reg2_t |  -.0044291     .00579     -0.765   0.444      -.0157775    .0069193
  reg3_t |  -.0007927    .005543     -0.143   0.886       -.011657    .0100716
  reg4_t |   .0004672   .0060583      0.077   0.939      -.0114071    .0123416
  reg5_t |  -.0044784   .0056674     -0.790   0.429      -.0155865    .0066297
  reg6_t |   .0001902   .0075627      0.025   0.980      -.0146326    .0150131
  reg7_t |    .021533   .0056039      3.842   0.000       .0105493    .0325168
  reg8_t |   .0117477   .0049526      2.372   0.018       .0020406    .0214548
  reg9_t |   .0169295   .0059699      2.836   0.005       .0052286    .0286305
 reg10_t |  -.0135639   .0069163     -1.961   0.050      -.0271199   -7.89e-06
 reg1_t2 |   .0019533   .0032974      0.592   0.554      -.0045096    .0084163
 reg2_t2 |   .0014963   .0029103      0.514   0.607       -.004208    .0072005
 reg3_t2 |   .0004716   .0027864      0.169   0.866      -.0049897    .0059329
 reg4_t2 |  -.0009867   .0030302     -0.326   0.745      -.0069259    .0049525
 reg5_t2 |   .0013214    .002861      0.462   0.644      -.0042861     .006929
 reg6_t2 |   .0005953   .0037794      0.158   0.875      -.0068123    .0080029
 reg7_t2 |  -.0086072   .0028411     -3.030   0.002      -.0141758   -.0030387
 reg8_t2 |  -.0036405    .002489     -1.463   0.144       -.008519    .0012379
 reg9_t2 |  -.0073205   .0029682     -2.466   0.014      -.0131381   -.0015028
reg10_t2 |   .0053272   .0034777      1.532   0.126      -.0014891    .0121436






Semiparametric estimation of wage equation
dependent variable =log wage
--------------------------------------
variable    coeff.    standard  T-statistic
    error
married    0.2325    0.0054   42.7527
    ed16    0.1618    0.0275    5.8866
    ed18    0.2372    0.0268    8.8618
   trend    0.0057    0.0073    0.7796
 trend_2    0.0171    0.0081    2.1169
 trend_3   -0.0074    0.0027   -2.7205
c1925_34    0.0128    0.0208    0.6167
c1935_44    0.0370    0.0197    1.8746
c1955_64   -0.0986    0.0208   -4.7316
c1965_76   -2.1077    0.3424   -6.1561
c25_ed16    0.1439    0.0401    3.5876
c35_ed16    0.1130    0.0306    3.6914
c55_ed16   -0.1233    0.0255   -4.8317
c65_ed16   -0.2344    0.0612   -3.8282
c25_ed18    0.3805    0.0429    8.8758
c35_ed18    0.1484    0.0307    4.8315
c55_ed18   -0.1958    0.0271   -7.2139
c65_ed18   -0.2987    0.0972   -3.0727
  c25_tr    0.0029    0.0122    0.2348
  c35_tr    0.0072    0.0096    0.7564
  c55_tr   -0.0331    0.0091   -3.6131
  c65_tr    0.3999    0.0807    4.9537
 ed16_tr    0.0044    0.0108    0.4039
ed16_tr2    0.0133    0.0124    1.0721
ed16_tr3   -0.0057    0.0041   -1.3789
 ed18_tr    0.0226    0.0113    2.0048
ed18_tr2    0.0075    0.0133    0.5610
ed18_tr3   -0.0058    0.0045   -1.2867
c25_16_t   -0.0055    0.0057   -0.9512
c35_16_t   -0.0036    0.0033   -1.0957
c55_16_t    0.0024    0.0024    1.0256
c65_16_t    0.0032    0.0045    0.7114
c25_18_t   -0.0227    0.0064   -3.5675
c35_18_t   -0.0076    0.0032   -2.3747
c55_18_t    0.0070    0.0025    2.7873
c65_18_t    0.0054    0.0065    0.8398
 c25_tr2   -0.0156    0.0190   -0.8192
 c25_tr3    0.0019    0.0085    0.2197
 c35_tr2   -0.0142    0.0119   -1.1878
 c35_tr3    0.0029    0.0042    0.6978
 c55_tr2    0.0403    0.0109    3.6901
 c55_tr3   -0.0113    0.0037   -3.0586
 c65_tr2   -0.2947    0.0615   -4.7886
 c65_tr3    0.0714    0.0152    4.7023
  reg_d1    0.0119    0.0219    0.5418
  reg_d2    0.0177    0.0203    0.8714
  reg_d3    0.0210    0.0198    1.0613
  reg_d4    0.0037    0.0214    0.1706
  reg_d5    0.0241    0.0194    1.2396
  reg_d6   -0.0220    0.0261   -0.8416
  reg_d7    0.0656    0.0207    3.1671
  reg_d8    0.0695    0.0184    3.7756
  reg_d9   -0.0752    0.0221   -3.4085
 reg_d10    0.0306    0.0259    1.1844
  reg1_t   -0.0036    0.0059   -0.6135
  reg2_t   -0.0019    0.0053   -0.3578
  reg3_t    0.0009    0.0052    0.1695
  reg4_t    0.0035    0.0056    0.6262	
  reg5_t   -0.0039    0.0052   -0.7436
  reg6_t    0.0063    0.0069    0.9136
  reg7_t    0.0264    0.0056    4.7559
  reg8_t    0.0167    0.0048    3.5026
  reg9_t    0.0215    0.0056    3.8165
 reg10_t   -0.0149    0.0066   -2.2648
 reg1_t2    0.0007    0.0031    0.2173
 reg2_t2    0.0005    0.0027    0.1976
 reg3_t2   -0.0002    0.0027   -0.0859
 reg4_t2   -0.0023    0.0029   -0.7820
 reg5_t2    0.0014    0.0027    0.4974
 reg6_t2   -0.0019    0.0036   -0.5145
 reg7_t2   -0.0117    0.0029   -3.9875
 reg8_t2   -0.0057    0.0025   -2.3277
 reg9_t2   -0.0092    0.0029   -3.1637



































Overall log average wages, 1978-96
year



























Overall male participation rate, 1978-96
year










male participation rate, cohort born 1935-44
year
 left education at/before 16  left education 17-18
 left education 19 or older








male participation rate, cohort born 1945-54
year
 left education at/before 16  left education 17-18
 left education 19 or older








mean out of work income
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raw aggregate earnings index
index corrected for hours
index after correction for covariance between wages and participation












 aggregate index  corrected aggregate
 micromodel prediction






























raw aggregate earnings index





















raw aggregate earnings index






















raw aggregate earnings index
















































raw aggregate earnings index
index corrected for selectivity only














































raw aggregate earnings index
index corrected for selectivity only












































raw aggregate earnings index
index corrected for selectivity only









increase in returns from selection: b 1935-44
year












increase in returns from selection: b 1945-54
year













increase in returns from selection: b 1955-64
year










Employment rate : North/South
year
 north  south

























raw aggregate earnings index



















raw aggregate earnings index




































raw aggregate earnings index

























raw aggregate earnings index
index after all corrections
micromodel prediction (corrected)




























































index measures from wage equations, 50
xprime_b
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